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Abstract
This paper presents a sequential search model where consumers look for several
products among competitive multiproduct rms. In a multiproduct search mar-
ket, both consumer behavior and rm behavior exhibit di¤erent features from the
single-product case: a consumer often returns to previously visited rms before
running out of options; and prices can decrease with search costs and increase
with the number of rms. The framework is then extended in two directions.
First, by introducing both single-product and multiproduct searchers, the model
can explain the phenomenon of countercyclical pricing, i.e., prices of many retail
products decline during peak-demand periods. Second, by allowing rms to use
bundling strategies, the model sheds new light on how bundling a¤ects market
performance. In a search environment, bundling tends to reduce consumer search
intensity, which can soften competition and reverse the usual welfare assessment
of competitive bundling in a perfect information setting.
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1 Introduction
Consumers often look for several products during a given shopping process. For exam-
ple, during ordinary grocery shopping they buy food, drinks and household products;
in high street shopping they purchase clothes, shoes and other goods; in the Christmas
season they often look for several presents. Sometimes a consumer seeks electronic com-
binations such as computer, printer and scanner; when furnishing a house they need
several furniture items; when going on holiday or attending a conference they book
both ights and hotels; and for new parents they look for many baby products. On
the other side of the market, there are many multiproduct rms such as supermarkets,
department stores, electronic retailers, and travel agencies which often supply most of
the products a consumer is searching for in a particular shopping trip. Usually the
shopping process also involves non-negligible search costs. Consumers need to reach
the store, nd out each products price and how suitable they are, and then may decide
to visit another store in pursuit of better deals. In e¤ect, in many cases a consumer
chooses to shop for several goods together to save on search costs.
Despite the ubiquity of multiproduct search and multiproduct rms,1 the search
literature has been largely concerned with single-product search markets. There are
probably two reasons why multiproduct search is under-researched. First, as I will
discuss in more detail later, a multiproduct search model is less tractable than a single-
product one. Second, people may also be concerned regarding how useful a multiprod-
uct search model will be. This paper develops a tractable model to study multiproduct
search markets. I nd that multiproduct consumer search actually has rich market
implications, and the developed framework can be used to address several interesting
economic issues. First, a multiproduct search market exhibits some qualitatively dif-
ferent properties compared to the single-product case. For example, in a multiproduct
search market, prices can decline with search costs and rise with the number of rms.
Second, the multiproduct search model can explain the phenomenon of countercyclical
pricing, i.e., prices of many retail products fall during high-demand periods such as
weekends and holidays. Third, the multiproduct search model provides an appropriate
setting for studying bundling in search markets, and sheds new light on how bundling
a¤ects market performance.
The basic framework of this paper is a sequential search model in which consumers
look for several products and care about both price and product suitability. Each rm
supplies all relevant products, but each product is horizontally di¤erentiated across
rms. By incurring a search cost, a consumer can visit a rm and learn all product and
price information. In particular, the cost of search is incurred jointly for all products,
and the consumer does not need to buy all products from the same rm, i.e., they can
mix and match after sampling at least two rms (if rms allow them to do so).
1Multiproduct search is also relevant in the labor market, for example, when a couple, as a collective
decision maker, is looking for jobs. See Guler, Guvenen, and Violante (2011) for a recent exploration
on this topic.
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In the basic model, I assume linear prices are used, i.e., rms set separate prices
for each product. A distinctive feature of consumer behavior in multiproduct search is
that a consumer may return to previously visited rms to buy some products before
running out of options. While in a standard single-product sequential search model,
a consumer never returns to earlier rms before having sampled all rms. As far as
pricing is concerned, with multiproduct consumer search, if a rm lowers one products
price, this will induce more consumers who are visiting it to terminate search and buy
some other products as well. That is, a reduction of one products price also boosts the
demand for the rms other products. I term this the joint search e¤ect. As a result,
even independent products are priced like complements.
Due to the joint search e¤ect, prices can decline with search costs in a multiproduct
search market. When search costs increase, the standard e¤ect is that consumers will
become more reluctant to shop around, which will induce rms to raise their prices.
However, in a multiproduct search market, higher search costs can also strengthen the
joint search e¤ect and make the products in each rm more like complements, which
will induce rms to lower their prices. When the latter e¤ect dominates prices will fall
with search costs. A related observation is that prices can rise with the number of rms.
This is because when there are more rms, it becomes more likely that a consumer will
return to previous rms to buy some products when she stops searching. This weakens
the joint search e¤ect and so the complementary pricing problem.
Another prediction of our model is that rms set lower prices in the multiproduct
search environment than in the single-product case. This is for two reasons: rst,
due to economies of scale in search, consumers on average sample more rms in the
multiproduct search case than in the single-product search case, which tends to increase
each products own-price elasticity; second, multiproduct search causes the joint search
e¤ect, which gives rise to the complementary pricing problem and so increases products
cross-price elasticities. There is a substantial body of evidence that prices of many retail
products drop during high-demand periods such as weekends and holidays.2 Our model
can o¤er a simple explanation for this phenomenon of countercyclical pricing. Suppose
there are both single-product searchers and multiproduct searchers in the market, and
suppose a higher proportion of consumers become multiproduct searchers during high-
demand periods (e.g., many households conduct their weekly grocery shopping during
weekends). Then the above result implies that prices will decline when demand surges.
The second part of this paper allows rms to engage in bundling (i.e., selling a
package of goods in a particular price). Bundling is a widely observed multiproduct
pricing strategy in the market. For example, many retailers o¤er a customer a dis-
count or reward (e.g., free delivery) if she buys several products together from the same
store. Bundling is usually explained as a price discrimination or entry deterrence de-
vice,3 but in a search environment it has a new function: it can discourage consumers
2See section 3.4 for related literature and other possible explanations for countercyclical pricing.
3See, for instance, Adams and Yellen (1976), and McAfee, McMillan, and Whinston (1989) for the
view of price discrimination, and Whinston (1990) and Nalebu¤ (2004) for the view of entry deterrence.
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from exploring rivalsdeals. This is because bundling reduces the anticipated bene-
t from mixing-and-matching after visiting another rm. As such, rms may have a
greater incentive to adopt the bundling strategy in a search market. Moreover, this
search-discouraging e¤ect works against the typical pro-competitive e¤ect of competi-
tive bundling in a perfect information scenario (see the related literature below).4 When
search costs are relatively high the new e¤ect can be such that bundling benets rms
and harms consumers.5
Since the seminal work by Stigler (1961), there has been a vast literature on search,
but most papers focus on single object search. There is a small branch of literature
that investigates the optimal stopping rule in multiproduct search. In Burdett and
Malueg (1981) and Carlson and McAfee (1984), consumers search for the lowest price
of a basket of goods among a large number of stores. The former mainly deals with
the case of free recall and the latter deals with the case of no recall. In both cases
the optimal stopping rule possesses the reservation property.6 Gatti (1999) considers a
more general setting with free recall in which consumers search for prices to maximize an
indirect utility function. He shows that the reservation property holds in multiproduct
search if the indirect utility function is submodular in prices, i.e., if a better o¤er in
one dimension (weakly) reduces the search incentive in the other dimension. (The
often adopted additive setting is a special case of that.) This branch of literature
has emphasized the similarity between single-product and multiproduct search in the
sense that in both cases the stopping rule often features the static reservation property.
However, I argue that despite this similarity, consumer search behavior still exhibits
substantial di¤erences between the two cases.
More importantly, the above works do not consider an active supply side, and the
price (or surplus) distribution among rms is exogenously given. According to our
knowledge, the only genuine equilibrium multiproduct search model is McAfee (1995).7
4In di¤erent settings, Carbajo, de Meza and Seidmann (1990) and Chen (1997) argue that (asym-
metric) bundling can create verticalproduct di¤erentiation between rms, thereby softening price
competition.
5The European Commission has recently branded all bundled nancial products as anti-competitive
and unfair. One of the main reasons is that the practice reduces consumer mobility. See the consultation
document On the Study of Tying and Other Potentially Unfair Commercial Practices in the Retail
Financial Service Section, 2009.
6However, with free recall consumers purchase nothing until search is terminated, while with no
recall consumers may buy some cheap goods rst and then continue to search for the other goods.
7Lal and Matutes (1994) also present a multiproduct search model where each product is homoge-
nous across rms and each consumer needs to pay a location-specic cost to reach rms and discover
the price information. Their setting is subject to the Diamond paradox. That is, no consumers will
participate in the market given that they expect each rm is charging the monopoly prices. Lal and
Matutes argue that rms can avoid the market collapse by employing loss-leading strategy, i.e., by
advertising (and committing to) low prices of some products to persuade consumers to visit the store.
However, in equilibrium each consumer still only samples one rm. Shelegia (2009) studies a multi-
product version of Varian (1980) in which for some exogenous reasons one group of consumers visits
only one store while the other visits two. The presence of heterogeneously informed consumers can be a
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It studies multiproduct price dispersion by extending Burdett and Judd (1983) to the
multiproduct case. Each product is homogenous across stores, and by incurring a search
cost a consumer can learn price information from a random number of stores. In par-
ticular, some consumers only learn information from one store while others learn more.
As a result, similar to the single-product case, rms adopt mixed pricing strategies,
reecting the trade-o¤ between exploiting less informed consumers and competing for
more informed consumers. However, multiproduct search generates multiple types of
(symmetric) equilibria. In particular, there is a continuum of equilibria in which rms
randomize prices on the reservation frontier such that one products price decline must
be associated with the rise of some other prices.8 Although the model o¤ers inter-
esting insights, both the multiplicity of equilibria and the complication of equilibrium
characterization restrict its applicability. Our paper develops an alternative multiprod-
uct search framework with di¤erentiated products where the symmetric equilibrium is
unique. I do not aim to address price dispersion. Instead, I use the developed frame-
work to address other important economic issues such as countercyclical pricing and
bundling in search markets.
In terms of the modelling approach, our paper is built on the single-product search
model with di¤erentiated products. That framework was initiated by Weitzman (1979),
and later developed and applied to a market context by Wolinsky (1986) and Ander-
son and Renault (1999). Compared to the homogeneous product search model, models
with product di¤erentiation often better reect consumer behavior in markets that
are typically characterized by nonstandardized products. Moreover, they avoid the
well-known modelling di¢ culty suggested by Diamond (1971), who shows that with
homogeneous products and positive search costs (no matter how small) all rms will
charge a monopoly price and all consumers will stop searching at the rst sampled
rm. So rivalry between rms has no impact on price. In search models with product
di¤erentiation, there are some consumers who are ill-matched with their initial choice
of supplier and then search further, so that the pro-competitive benet of actual search
is present.9 Recently this framework has been adopted to study various economic is-
sues such as prominence and non-random consumer search (Armstrong, Vickers, and
Zhou, 2009), rmsincentive to use selling tactics such as exploding o¤ers and buy-now
consequence of rational search, but without an explicit search model the main insights from our paper
are absent there. Rhodes (2010) proposes a multiproduct monopoly model in which each consumer
knows her private valuations for all products but needs to incur a cost to reach the rm and learn
prices. He shows that selling multiple products can solve the Diamond hold-up problem which would
unravel the market in a single-product case with inelastic consumer demand.
8In the other type of equilibria, rms randomize prices over the acceptance set (not just on its
border). They are, however, qualitatively similar to the single-product equilibrium in the sense that
the marginal price distribution for each product is the same as in the single-product search case, and
so is the prot from each product.
9In the homogeneous product scenario, the main approach to avoid the Diamond paradox is to
introduce heterogeneously informed consumers. See, for example, Burdett and Judd (1983) and Stahl
(1989), where price dispersion arises endogenously and so consumers have incentive to search.
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discounts (Armstrong and Zhou, 2010), how the decline of search costs a¤ects prod-
uct design (Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat, 2009), and attention-grabbing advertising
(Haan and Moraga-González, 2011). This paper extends the basic framework in this
literature to the multiproduct case.
Last but not least, this paper contributes to the literature on competitive bundling.
Matutes and Regibeau (1988), Economides (1989), and Nalebu¤ (2000) have studied
competitive pure bundling, and Matutes and Regibeau (1992), Anderson and Leruth
(1993), Thanassoulis (2007), and Armstrong and Vickers (2010) have studied duopoly
mixed bundling.10 One important insight emerging from all these works is that bundling
(whether pure or mixed) has a tendency to intensify price competition, and under the
assumptions of unit demand and full market coverage (which are also retained in this
paper) it typically reduces rm prots and boosts consumer welfare.11 This paper
is the rst to study bundling in a search environment. Our ndings indicate that
assuming away information frictions (which usually do exist in consumer markets) may
signicantly distort the welfare assessment of bundling. In particular, when search costs
are relatively high, bundling may actually benet rms and harm consumers. As such,
our work complements the existing literature.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
with linear pricing and analyzes consumer search behavior. Section 3 characterizes
equilibrium linear prices in a duopoly and conducts comparative statics analysis, and
an application to countercyclical pricing is then discussed. Section 4 studies bundling
in a search market and examines its welfare impacts relative to linear pricing. Section
5 discusses the case with more rms and other extensions, and section 6 concludes.
Omitted proofs and calculations are presented in the Appendix.
2 A Model of Multiproduct Search
There are a large number of consumers in the market, and the measure of them is
normalized to one. Each consumer is looking for a number of products. For example,
a consumer who is furnishing her house may need to buy several furniture items; a
high-street shopper may be looking for both clothes and shoes. For simplicity, let us
assume that each consumer needs two products 1 and 2, and they have unit demand for
each product. There are n  2 multiproduct rms in the market, each supplying both
products at a constant marginal cost which is normalized to zero. Suppose each product
is horizontally di¤erentiated across rms. For example, di¤erent rms may supply
di¤erent brands of furniture or clothes and shoes with di¤erent styles, and consumers
often have idiosyncratic tastes. I model this scenario by extending the random utility
model in Perlo¤ and Salop (1985) to the two-product case. Specically, a consumers
10Most of these studies adopt the two-dimensional Hotelling setting and assume that consumers are
distributed uniformly on the square and have unit demand for each product. Armstrong and Vickers
(2010) consider a fairly general setting with arbitrary distributions and elastic demand.
11The welfare impact of bundling in the monopoly case is ambiguous (e.g., Schmalensee, 1984).
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valuations for the two products in each rm are randomly drawn from a common joint
cumulative distribution function F (u1; u2) dened on [u1; u1]  [u2; u2] which has a
continuous density f(u1; u2). The valuations are realized independently across rms and
consumers (but a consumer may have correlated valuations for the two products in the
same rm). For simplicity, I assume that the two products are neither complements nor
substitutes, in the sense that a consumer obtains an additive utility u1 + u2 if product
i has a match utility ui, i = 1; 2. (See a discussion about intrinsic complements in
section 5.5.) Let Fi(ui) and Hi(uijuj) denote the marginal and conditional distribution
functions; fi(ui) and hi(uijuj) denote the marginal and conditional densities.
Following Perlo¤ and Salop (1985), I assume that in equilibrium all consumers buy
both products, i.e., the market is fully covered.12 (This is the case, for example, when
consumers have no outside options or when they have large basic valuations for each
product on top of the above match utilities.) However, consumers do not need to
purchase both products from the same rm. This possibility of multi-stop shopping is
realistic and also important for our model. Otherwise, the multiproduct search model
would degenerate to a single-product one with a composite product with match utility
u1+u2. In the basic model, rms must charge a separate price for each product. I refer
to this case as linear pricinghenceforth. (I will consider bundling in section 4.)
I introduce imperfect information and consumer search as Wolinsky (1986) and
Anderson and Renault (1999) did in a single-product framework. Initially consumers are
assumed to have imperfect information about the (actual) prices rms are charging and
match utilities of all products.13 But they can gather information through a sequential
search process: by incurring a search cost s  0, a consumer can visit a rm and nd
out both prices (p1; p2) and both match utilities (u1; u2). At each rm (except the last
one), the consumer faces the following options: stop searching and buy both products
(maybe from rms visited earlier), or buy one product and keep searching for the other,
or keep searching for both products. The cost of search is assumed to be the same
no matter how many products a consumer is looking for, which reects economies of
scale in search. I also assume away other possible costs involved in sourcing supplies
from more than one rm. Finally, following most of the literature on consumer search, I
suppose that consumers have free recall, i.e., there are no extra costs in buying products
from a previously visited store.
Both consumers and rms are assumed to be risk neutral. I focus on symmetric
equilibria in which rms set the same (linear) prices and consumers sample rms in
12The assumption of full market coverage is often adopted for simplicity in oligopoly models. In this
paper, neither the joint search e¤ect nor the e¤ect of bundling on consumer search incentive relies on
this assumption, so the main insights can carry over even without this assumption (though the analysis
will become more involved).
13In the markets (e.g., the grocery market) where consumers shop frequently, some consumers should
be able to learn both price and product information if they do not vary over time. However, in reality
both prices and product variants in many retailers change over time such that imperfect information
might be a plausible presumption.
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a random order (and without replacement).14 I use the perfect Bayesian equilibrium
concept. Firms set prices simultaneously, given their expectation of consumerssearch
behavior. Consumers search optimally, to maximize their expected surplus, given the
match utility distribution and their rational beliefs about rmspricing strategy. At
each rm, even after observing o¤-equilibrium o¤ers, consumers hold the equilibrium
belief about the unsampled rmsprices.15
I have made several simplifying assumptions to make the model tractable.
Economies of scale in search. Our assumption that the cost of search is independent
of the number of products a consumer is seeking is an approximation when the search
cost is mainly for learning the existence of a seller or for reaching the store. In the other
polar case where the cost of search is totally divisible among products (so no economies
of scale in search at all), the multiproduct search problem degenerates to two separate
single-product search problems. In reality, most situations are in between (e.g., a typical
shopping process involves a xed cost for reaching the store and also variable in-store
search costs for nding and inspecting each product). Our simplication is both for
analytical convenience and for highlighting the di¤erence between multiproduct and
single-product search.
Free recall. Free recall is often assumed in the consumer search literature. It could
be appropriate, for instance, when a consumer can phone previously visited rms (e.g.,
furniture stores) to order the products she decides to buy, or when shopping online a
consumer can leave the browsed websites open. Sometimes we also assume no recall at
all (especially in the job search literature). In most consumer markets, however, there
are usually positive returning costs but they are not so high that returning is totally
banned. I choose to assume free recall both for tractability,16 and for facilitating the
comparison between our model and the corresponding single-product search model in
Wolinsky (1986) and Anderson and Renault (1999) (both of which assume free recall).
I will discuss how costly recall or no recall could a¤ect our results in section 5.3.
14As usual in search models, there exists an uninteresting equilibrium where consumers expect all
rms to set very high prices which leave them with no surplus, consumers do not participate in the
market at all, and so rms have no incentive to reduce their prices. I do not consider this equilibrium
further. In addition, there may also exist asymmetric equlibria with active search, and I will discuss
this issue in section 5.1.
15This o¤-equilibrium belief is reasonable because in our setting there are no correlated economic
shocks (e.g., aggregate cost shocks) across rms and so their pricing decisions are independent to each
other. In an alternative setting, say, with correlated cost shocks, a consumer who observes a low
price in one rm may infer that other rms also have low costs and so anticipate that they are also
charging low prices. See, for instance, Bénabou and Gertner (1993) for such a learning model in the
single-product search scenario.
16According to my knowledge, Janssen and Parakhonyak (2010) is the only paper in the economics
literature which studies the optimal stopping rule in the single-product search case with costly recall.
They nd that when there are more than two (but a nite number of) rms, the stopping rule is
non-stationary and depends on the historical o¤ers in an intricate way. The optimal stopping rule in
multiproduct search with costly recall and an arbitrary number of rms is still an open question.
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Two-stop shopping costs. Even if search costs and returning costs are absent, trans-
acting with two rms may involve some other costs (e.g., the cost of paying two bills).
But in many retail markets, this kind of two-stop shopping costs seem less important
than search costs. I will discuss the di¤erence between this market friction and search
friction in section 5.4. (Two-stop shopping costs are also similar to the joint-purchase
discount I will examine in the bundling part.)
2.1 The optimal stopping rule
I rst derive the optimal stopping rule (which has been proved in Burdett and Malueg,
1981, or Gatti, 1999 in a price search scenario). The rst observation is that given the
indivisible search cost and free recall a consumer will never buy one product rst and
keep searching for the other. Hence, at any store (except the last one) the consumer
faces only two options: stop searching and buy both products (one of which may be
from a rm visited earlier), or keep searching for both.
Denote by
 i(x) 
Z ui
x
(ui   x)dFi(ui) =
Z ui
x
[1  Fi(ui)]dui (1)
the expected incremental benet from sampling one more product i when the maximum
utility of product i so far is x. (The second equality is from integration by parts.) Note
that  i(x) is decreasing and convex. Then the optimal stopping rule in a symmetric
equilibrium is as follows.
Lemma 1 Suppose prices are linear and symmetric across rms. Suppose the maxi-
mum match utility of product i observed so far is zi and there are rms left unsampled.
Then a consumer will stop searching if and only if
1(z1) + 2(z2)  s : (2)
The left-hand side of (2) is the expected benet from sampling one more rm given
the pair of maximum utilities so far is (z1; z2), and the right-hand side is the search
cost. This stopping rule seems myopicat the rst glance, but it is indeed sequentially
rational. It can be understood by backward induction. When in the penultimate rm,
it is clear that (2) gives the optimal stopping rule because given (z1; z2) the expected
benet from sampling the last rm is E[max (0; u1   z1)+max (0; u2   z2)], which equals
the left-hand side of (2). (Note that I did not assume u1 and u2 are independent of each
other. The separability of the incremental benet in (2) is because of the additivity
of match utilities and the linearity of the expectation operator.) Now step back and
consider the situation when the consumer is at the rm before that. If (2) is violated,
then sampling one more rm is always desirable. By contrast, if (2) holds, then even
if the consumer continues searching, she will stop at the next rm no matter what
she will nd there. So the benet from keeping searching is the same as sampling one
more rm. Expecting that, the consumer should actually cease her search now. (This
stopping rule also carries over to the case with an innite number of rms.)
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Figure 1 below illustrates the optimal stopping rule.
z1
z2
A
B
a1
a2
z r r
r
z _ u
u
z2 = (z1)
Figure 1: The optimal stopping rule in multiproduct search with perfect recall
A is the set of (z1; z2) which satises (2) and let us refer to it as the acceptance set.
Then a consumer will stop searching if and only if the maximum utility pair so far
lies within A. Dene the border of A as z2 = (z1), i.e., (z1; (z1)) satises (2) with
equality, and call it the reservation frontier. One can show that A is a convex set, and
the reservation frontier is decreasing and convex.17 Let B be the complement of A.
Note that ai on the graph is just the reservation utility level when the consumer is only
searching for product i. It solves
 i(ai) = s ; (3)
and satises (a1) = u2 and (u1) = a2. This is because when the maximum possible
utility of one product has been achieved, the consumer will behave as if she is only
searching for the other product.
It is worth mentioning that from (1) and (2), one can see that only the marginal
distributions matter for the expected benet of sampling one more rm. This implies
that if the marginal distributions are xed, the correlation of the two productsmatch
utilities does not a¤ect the reservation frontier.
Search behavior comparison. It is useful to compare consumer search behavior be-
tween single-product search and multiproduct search. The early literature has empha-
sized that in both cases (given additive utilities in the multiproduct case) the optimal
stopping rule possesses the static reservation property. Despite this similarity, con-
sumerssearch behavior exhibits some di¤erences between the two cases, which have
not been discussed before.
17From the equality of (2), we have
0(z1) =   1  F1(z1)
1  F2((z1)) < 0 ;
and this derivative increases with z1.
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In single-product search with perfect recall, the stopping rule is characterized by a
reservation utility a. When a consumer is already at some rm (except the last one),
she will stop searching if and only if the current product has a utility greater than
a. Previous o¤ers are irrelevant because they must be worse than a (otherwise the
consumer would not have come to this rm). As a result, a consumer never returns to
previously visited rms until she nishes sampling all rms. In particular, if there are
an innite number of rms, the consumer actually never exercises the recall option.
However, in multiproduct search, a consumers search decision may depend on both
the current rms o¤er u and the best o¤er so far z. This can be seen from the example
indicated in Figure 1, where the current o¤er u lies outside the acceptance set A but
the consumer will stop searching because z_u 2 A (where _ denotes the joinof two
vectors). As a result, in multiproduct search (even with an innite number of rms),
although a consumer will buy at least one product at the rm where she stops searching,
she may return to a previous rm and buy the other product even if there are rms left
unsampled. In the above example, the consumer will go back to some previous rm to
buy product 2.
These di¤erences will complicate the demand analysis in multiproduct search. In
particular, unlike the single-product search case, considering an innite number of rms
does not simplify the analysis (mainly because various types of returning consumers
still exist). However, the complication can be avoided if there are only two rms.
Moreover, as I will discuss in section 5.2, such a simplication does not lose the most
important insights concerning rm pricing in a multiproduct search setting. Hence,
in the following analysis, I mainly deal with the duopoly case. (A detailed analysis
of the general case with more than two rms is provided in the online supplementary
document at https://sites.google.com/site/jidongzhou77/research.)
3 Equilibrium Prices
3.1 The single-product benchmark
To facilitate comparison, I rst report some results from the single-product search
model (see Wolinsky, 1986 and Anderson and Renault, 1999 for an analysis with n
rms). Suppose the product in question is product i, and the unit search cost is still s.
Then the reservation utility level is ai dened in (3), and it decreases with s. That is,
in a symmetric equilibrium, a consumer will keep searching if and only if the maximum
match utility so far is lower than ai, and a higher search cost will make the consumer
less willing to search on. In the following analysis, I will mainly focus on the case with
a relatively small search cost:
s <  i(ui), ai > ui for both i = 1; 2 : (4)
(Remember that  i(ui) is the expected benet from sampling another product i when
the current one has the lowest possible match value.) This condition ensures an active
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search market even in the single-product case.
The symmetric equilibrium price p0i is then determined by
1
p0i
= fi(ai)[1  Fi(ai)] + 2
Z ai
ui
fi(u)
2du| {z }
0
: (5)
(Its intuition will be clear soon.) It follows that p0i increases with the search cost s (or
decreases with ai) if
fi(ai)
2 + f 0i(ai)[1  Fi(ai)]  0 :
This condition is equivalent to an increasing hazard rate fi=(1 Fi). Then we have the
following result (Anderson and Renault, 1999 have shown this result for an arbitrary
number of rms).
Proposition 1 Suppose the consumer is only searching for product i and the search
cost condition (4) holds. Then the equilibrium price dened in (5) increases with the
search cost if the match utility has an increasing hazard rate fi=(1  Fi).
3.2 Equilibrium prices in multiproduct search
I now turn to the multiproduct search case. Let (p1; p2) be the symmetric equilibrium
prices. For notational convenience, let (u1; u2) be the match utilities of rm 1, the rm
in question, and (v1; v2) be the match utilities of rm 2, the rival rm. In equilibrium, for
a consumer who samples rm 1 rst, her reservation frontier u2 = (u1) is determined
by
1(u1) + 2((u1)) = s ; (6)
which simply says that the expected benet of sampling rm 2 is equal to the search cost.
Note that (u1) is only dened for u1 2 [a1; u1] (see Figure 2 below). For convenience,
let us extend its domain to all possible values of u1, but stipulate (u1) > u2 for u1 < a1.
Instead of writing down the demand functions and deriving the rst-order conditions
for the equilibrium prices directly, I use the following economically more illuminating
method. Starting from an equilibrium, suppose rm 1 unilaterally decreases p2 by a
small ". How will this adjustment a¤ect rm 1s prots? Let us focus on the rst-order
e¤ects. First of all, rm 1 su¤ers a loss from those consumers who only buy product 2
from it because they are now paying less. Since in equilibrium half of the consumers buy
product 2 from rm 1 (remember the assumption of full market coverage), this loss is
"=2. Second, rm 1 gains from boosted demand: (i) For those consumers who visit rm
1 rst, they will be more likely to stop searching since they hold equilibrium beliefs that
the second rm is charging the equilibrium prices. Once they stop searching, they will
buy both products from rm 1 immediately. (ii) For those consumers who eventually
sample both rms, they will be more likely to buy product 2 from rm 1due to the
price reduction. In equilibrium, the loss and gain should be such that rm 1 has no
incentive to deviate, which generates the rst-order condition for p2.
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Now let us analyze in detail the two (rst-order) gains from the proposed small
price reduction. The rst gain is from the e¤ect of the price reduction on consumers
search decisions. How many consumers who sample rm 1 rst will be induced to stop
searching by the price reduction? (Note that the consumers who sample rm 2 rst
hold equilibrium beliefs and so their stopping decisions remain unchanged.) Denote by
(u1j") the new reservation frontier. Since reducing p2 by " is equivalent to increasing
u2 by ", (u1j") solves
1(u1) + 2((u1j") + ") = s ;
so (u1j") = (u1)   " according to the denition of (). That is, the reservation
frontier moves downward everywhere by ", and the stopping region A expands (i.e.,
more consumers buy immediately at rm 1) as illustrated in the gure below.
u1
u2
A(")
B(")
u2 = (u1)
u2 = (u1j")
a1
a2   "
a2pppppppppppppppppppp
pppppp
pppp
ppp
Figure 2: Price deviation and the stopping rule
For a small ", the number of consumers who switch from keeping searching to buying
immediately at rm 1 (i.e., the probability measure of the shaded area between (u1)
and (u1j")) is
"
2
Z u1
a1
f(u; (u))du : (7)
(Remember that half of the consumers sample rm 1 rst. The integral term is the line
integral along the reservation frontier in the u1 dimension.)
What is rm 1s net benet from these marginal consumers? Realize that these
marginal consumers now buy both products from rm 1 for sure, while before the price
deviation they only bought each product from rm 1 with some probability less than one
(i.e., when they search on but nd worse products at rm 2). To be specic, consider
a marginal consumer on the reservation frontier with match utilities (u1; (u1)). If she
chooses to sample rm 2, then she will nd a worse product 1 at rm 2 (i.e., v1 < u1)
with probability F1(u1), in which case she will return to rm 1 and buy its product
1. Similarly, if she continues to sample rm 2, she will nd a worse product 2 at rm
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2 (i.e., v2 < (u1)) with probability F2((u1)), in which case she will return to rm 1
and buy its product 2. Hence, the net benet from inducing this marginal consumer
from searching on is p1[1   F1(u)] + p2[1   F2((u1))]. We then sum this benet over
all marginal consumers on the reservation frontier. By using (7), this total benet is
"
2
Z u1
a1
fp1[1  F1(u)] + p2[1  F2((u1))]g f(u; (u))du : (8)
The second gain is from those consumers who have sampled both rms because they
will now buy product 2 from rm 1 more likely due to the price reduction. Consider
rst a consumer who visits rm 1 rst and nds match utilities (u1; u2) 2 B("). She
will then continue to visit rm 2, but will return to rm 1 and buy its product 2 if
v2 < u2 + ". The probability of that event is F2(u2 + ")  F2(u2) + "f2(u2). So the
small price adjustment increases the probability that this consumer buys product 2
from rm 1 by "f2(u2). Then the total increased probability from all such consumers
is "
2
R
B(")
f2(u2)dF (u)  "2
R
B
f2(u2)dF (u). (Since B(") converges to B as " ! 0, we
can discard all higher order e¤ects.) Similarly, one can show that the gain from those
consumers who sample rm 2 rst and then come to rm 1 is "
2
R
B
f2(v2)dF (v). Adding
these two benets together gives us the second gain which is
p2"
Z
B
f2(u2)dF (u) : (9)
In equilibrium, the (rst-order) loss "=2 from the small price reduction should be
equal to the sum of the two (rst-order) gains in (8) and (9). This yields the rst-order
condition for p2:
1 = 2p2
Z
B
f2(u2)dF (u) + p2
Z u1
a1
[1  F2((u))]f(u; (u))du| {z }
standard e¤ect
(10)
+ p1
Z u1
a1
[1  F1(u)]f(u; (u))du| {z }
joint search e¤ect
:
The rst two terms on the right-hand side capture the standard e¤ect of a products
price adjustment on its own demand: reducing p2 increases demand for product 2.
(This is similar to the right-hand side of (5) in the single-product search case.) The
last term, however, captures a new feature of the multiproduct search model: when
rm 1 reduces p2, more consumers who sample it rst will stop searching and buy
both products, which increases the demand for its product 1 as well. This makes the
two products supplied by the same rm like complements even if they are physically
independent. This e¤ect occurs because each consumer is searching for two products
and the cost of search is incurred jointly for them, and so I refer to it as the joint search
e¤ect henceforth. Also notice that the size of the joint search e¤ect (which determines
the degree of complementaritybetween the two products in each rm) relies on the
mass of marginal consumers on the reservation frontier, i.e., (7). It depends not only on
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the density function f but also on the lengthof the reservation frontier as indicated in
Figure 2. For example, in the uniform distribution case, when the search cost increases,
the reservation frontier becomes longer such that the mass of marginal consumers rises
and so the two products become more like complements. As we shall see below, this
observation plays an important role in rmspricing decisions.
Similarly, one can derive the rst-order condition for p1 as:
1 = 2p1
Z
B
f1(u1)dF (u) + p1
Z u2
a2
[1  F1( 1(u))]f( 1(u); u)du (11)
+ p2
Z u2
a2
[1  F2(u)]f( 1(u); u)du ;
where  1 is the inverse function of . I summarize the results in the following lemma.18
Lemma 2 Under the search cost condition (4), the rst-order conditions for p1 and p2
to be the equilibrium prices are given in (10) and (11).
Both (10) and (11) are linear equations in prices, and the system of them has a
unique solution. Thus, the symmetric equilibrium, if it exists, will be unique.19 Notice
that if rms ignored the joint search e¤ect, then the pricing problem would be actually
separable between the two products. A special case is when s = 0 (so ai = ui and
B equals the whole match utility domain). Then the e¤ect of a price adjustment on
consumer search behavior (i.e., (8)) disappears, and the rst-order conditions simplify
to
1
pi
= 2
Z ui
ui
fi(u)
2du :
In this case, the multiproduct model yields the same equilibrium prices as the single-
product model.
18One can also derive the rst-order conditions by calculating the demand functions directly. For
example, when rm 1 unilaterally deviates to (p1   "1; p2   "2), the demand for its product 1 is
1
2
Z u1
u1
[1 H2((u1j")ju1)(1  F1(u1 + "1))] dF1(u1) + 1
2
Z u1
u1
H2((v1)jv1)(1  F1(v1   "1))dF1(v1) ;
where " = ("1; "2), (u1j") = (u1 + "1)  "2 is the reservation frontier associated with the deviation,
and Hi(j) is the conditional distribution function. Consumers who sample rm 1 rst will buy its
product 1 if they stop searching immediately or if they search on but nd rm 2s product 1 is worse.
Consumers who sample rm 2 rst will purchase rm 1s product 1 if they come to rm 1 and nd rm
1s product 1 is better. The deviation demand for product 2 is similar. However, this direct method
will become less applicable in the case with more products, more rms, or mixed bundling.
19In my multiproduct search model, it is rather complicated to investigate the second-order condition
in general. However, in the online supplementary document, I show that in the case with two symmetric
products, each rms prot function is locally concave around the prices dened in (10) and (11) under
fairly general conditions. In the uniform and exponential examples (which use for illustration below),
one can numerically verify that a rms prot function is also globally concave such that the rst-order
conditions are su¢ cient for the equilibrium prices.
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In the following analysis, I will often rely on the case of symmetric products. Slightly
abusing the notation, let the one-variable functions F () and f() denote the common
marginal distribution function and density function, respectively. Let a be the com-
mon reservation utility in each dimension. In particular, with symmetric products, we
have f(u1; u2) = f(u2; u1) and the reservation frontier satises () =  1(), i.e., it is
symmetric around the 45-degree line in the match utility space. If p is the equilibrium
price of each product, then both (10) and (11) simplify to
1
p
= 2
Z
B
f(ui)f(ui; uj)du+
Z u
a
[1  F ((u))]f(u; (u))du| {z }
standard e¤ect: 
(12)
+
Z u
a
[1  F (u)]f(u; (u))du| {z }
joint search e¤ect: 
:
Before proceeding to the comparative statics analysis, let us rst study two exam-
ples.
The uniform example: Suppose u1 and u2 are independent, and ui s U [0; 1]. Then
 i(x) = (1   x)2=2. So a = 1  
p
2s and the search cost condition (4) requires
s  1=2. The reservation frontier satises
(1  u)2 + (1  (u))2 = 2s ;
so the stopping region A is a quarter of a disk with a radius
p
2s. Then (12)
implies20
p =
1
2  (=2  1)s ;
where   3:14 is the mathematical constant.
The exponential example: Suppose u1 and u2 are independent, and fi(ui) = e ui
for ui 2 [0;1). Then  i(x) = e x. So e a = s and the search cost condition (4)
requires s  1. The reservation frontier satises
e u + e (u) = s ;
so (u) is one branch of a hyperbola. Then (12) implies21
p =
1
1 + s3=6
:
20The standard e¤ect is  = 2   s=2: the rst term in (12) is 2 R
B
du, so it equals two times the
area of region B, i.e., 2(1  s=2) = 2  s; and the second term is R 1
a
[1 (u)]du, which is the area of
region A and so equals s=2. The joint search e¤ect is  =
R 1
a
(1 u)du = s according to the denition
of a.
21One can check that the standard e¤ect is  = 1 and the joint search e¤ect is  = s3=6.
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The prices in these two examples are depicted as the thick solid curves in Figure 3
below. The price increases with search costs in the uniform example, but it decreases
with search costs in the exponential example. As we will see below, the result that prices
can decline with search costs is not exceptional in our multiproduct search model.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
s
(a) uniform example
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1.05
s
(b) exponential example
Figure 3: Prices and search costs (symmetric products)
3.3 Search cost and price
This section investigates how search costs a¤ect prices in our multiproduct search model.
When search costs rise, there are two e¤ects. First, consumers will become more reluc-
tant to shop around, and so fewer of them will sample both rms (i.e., the region of
B shrinks), which always induces rms to raise their prices. Second, when search costs
rise, the mass of marginal consumers who distribute on the reservation frontier also
changes. This is another determinant for prices. In particular, if the mass of marginal
consumers increases with search costs (which occurs more likely in the multiproduct
case than in single-product case because the reservation frontier often becomes longer
as search costs rise in the permitted range of (4)), rms have an incentive to reduce
their prices. This incentive is further strengthened in the multiproduct case due to
the joint search e¤ect (i.e., stopping a marginal consumer from searching on can boost
demand for both products). The nal prediction depends on which e¤ect dominates.
Our rst observation is that if the joint search e¤ect were absent, then the marginal-
consumer e¤ect would be usually insu¢ cient to outweigh the rst. Denote by ~pi, i = 1; 2,
the hypothetical equilibrium prices if rms ignore the joint search e¤ect (i.e., they solve
(10) and (11) without the second line of each equation). (All omitted proofs can be
found in Appendix A.)
Lemma 3 Suppose the search cost condition (4) holds and
hi(uijuj)
1  Fi(ui) increases with ui for any given uj. (13)
Then ~pi; i = 1; 2; weakly increase with the search cost.
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That is, without the joint search e¤ect, the relationship between prices and search
costs would be actually similar to that in the single-product scenario. (Note that the
condition (13) is just the standard increasing hazard rate condition if the two products
have independent match utilities.) For instance, in the uniform example, we have
~pi = 1=(2  s=2) which increases with s; and in the exponential example which has a
constant hazard rate, we have ~pi = 1 which is independent of s (so pi decreasing with
s in this case is purely due to the joint search e¤ect).
However, taking into account the joint search e¤ect will qualitatively change the
picture. I pursue this issue by considering two cases.
Symmetric products. Suppose rst the two products are symmetric, and so the
equilibrium price p is given in (12). Lemma 3 implies that the standard e¤ect  indicated
in (12) usually decreases with s. However, the joint search e¤ect  can vary with s in
either direction even under the regularity condition. If  also decreases with s, then the
joint search e¤ect will make the price increase with search costs even faster. Conversely,
if  increases with s, then the joint search e¤ect will mitigate or even overturn the usual
relationship between price and search costs. As shown in the proof of next proposition,
d
ds
= f(a; u) 
Z u
a
h0(uj(u))f((u))du : (14)
This derivative is positive, for example, when the (conditional) density function is
weakly decreasing. This is true in both the uniform and exponential example.
As a result, the standard hazard rate condition is no longer enough to ensure that
prices increase with search costs in our model. The following result gives a new condi-
tion.
Proposition 2 Suppose the search cost condition (4) holds, and the two products are
symmetric. Then the equilibrium price p dened in (12) increases with the search cost
if and only ifZ u
a
f((u))
1  F ((u)) ff(u)h(uj(u)) + [2  F (u)  F ((u))]h
0(uj(u))g du > f(a; u) (15)
for all a. If the two products further have independent valuations, a su¢ cient condition
for (15) is that the marginal density f(u) is (weakly) increasing.
Condition (15), however, can be easily violated by some distributions having a
decreasing or non-monotonic density (but still having an increasing hazard rate).22 As
well as the exponential case, other relatively simple examples include: the distribution
with a decreasing density f(u) = 2(1  u) for s 2 [0; 1=3]; and the logistic distribution
f(u) = eu=(1 + eu)2 for s less than about 1.
22One may wonder, if f(a; u) is bounded away from zero, whether the condition always fails to hold
as a ! u (i.e., as s ! 0). This is not true because f((u))1 F ((u)) may converge to innity at the same
time. For example, in the uniform case, the left-hand side is equal to 2   1 > 0, independent of a.
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On the other hand, if rms supply (and consumers need) more products, the joint
search e¤ect could have an even more pronounced impact such that prices fall with
search costs more likely. I can extend the two-product model to the case with m prod-
ucts (see the details in Appendix A). In particular, in the uniform case, the equilibrium
price p has a simple formula:
1
p
= 2  Vm(
p
2s)
2m| {z }
standard e¤ect
+
(m  1)Vm(
p
2s)
2m 1| {z }
joint search e¤ect
; (16)
where s 2 [0; 1=2] and Vm(
p
2s) is the volume of an m-dimensional sphere with a radiusp
2s.23 One can check that p increases with s if and only if m < 1 + =2  2:6. Then
we have the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose the search cost condition (4) holds, and each rm supplies m
symmetric products with independent valuations ui s U [0; 1]. Then the equilibrium
price p dened in (16) increases with s if m  2 and decreases with s if m  3.
In this example, if the joint search e¤ect were absent, the price would increase with
the search cost for any m. But its presence makes the price decline with search costs
whenever consumers are searching for more than two products.
Asymmetric products. Another force which could inuence the relationship between
prices and search costs is product asymmetry. Intuitively, when one product has a lower
prot margin than the other, the joint search e¤ect from adjusting its price is stronger
(i.e., reducing its price can induce consumers to buy the more protable product). Then
this products price may go down with the search cost. I conrm this possibility in a
uniform example in which product 1 is a smallitem and has match utility uniformly
distributed on [0; 1], and product 2 is a big item and has match utility uniformly
distributed on [0; 4]. Figure 4 below depicts how p1 (in the left panel) and p2 (in the
right panel) vary with search costs. This example suggests that when the two products
are asymmetric, search costs can a¤ect their prices in di¤erent directions.
23The volume formula for an m-dimensional sphere with a radius r is Vm(r) =
(r
p
)m
 (1+m=2) , where  ()
is the Gamma function. One can show that for any xed r, limm!1 Vm(r) = 0. Then as m goes to
innity, p will approach the perfect information price 1=2. This is because for a xed search cost, if
each consumer is searching for a large number of products, they will almost surely sample both rms.
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(b) bigitem
Figure 4: Prices and search costs (asymmetric products)
Discussion: larger search costs. The analysis so far has been restricted to relatively
small search costs such that it is even worthwhile to search for one good alone. I now
discuss the case with higher search costs beyond condition (4). (In some circumstances,
a consumer conducts multiproduct search maybe just because it is not worthwhile to
search for each good separately.) As we shall see later, this discussion will also be useful
for understanding the results in the bundling case. For simplicity, let us focus on the
case of symmetric products. Suppose the condition (4) is violated such that s >  i(u)
and a < u. (But s cannot exceed 2 i(u) in order to ensure an active search market.)
Then the reservation frontier is shown in Figure 5 below, where c = (u).
u1
u2
A
B
c
c
u2 = (u1)
Figure 5: The optimal stopping rule for a large search cost
The key di¤erence between this case and the case of small search costs is that now the
frontier becomes shorteras search costs go up. This feature has a signicant impact
on how prices vary with search costs. For example, in the uniform case, a higher search
cost now leads to fewer marginal consumers on the reservation frontier, which provides
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rms with a greater incentive to raise prices. (In this case, the joint search e¤ect
strengthens the usual relationship between prices and search costs.)
In general, the following result suggests that prices often increase with search costs
when they are beyond the condition (4). (The equilibrium price formula is given in the
proof.)
Proposition 4 Suppose the two products are symmetric and have independent match
utilities, and search costs are relatively high such that  i(u) < s < 2 i(u). Then the
equilibrium price p increases with search costs if each products match utility has a
monotonic density and an increasing hazard rate.
For example, in the exponential example, we now have p = 1=(4=3   s3=6) for
s 2 (1; 2), which increases with s.
3.4 Price comparison with single-product search
As the end of this section, I compare the multiproduct search prices in section 3.2
with the single-product search prices in section 3.1, and discuss one possible empirical
implication of the result.
Proposition 5 Suppose the search cost condition (4) and the regularity condition (13)
hold. Then pi  p0i ; i = 1; 2; i.e., each products price is lower in multiproduct search
than in single-product search.
This result is intuitive. In our model, there are economies of scale in search, i.e.,
searching for two products is as costly as searching for only one, so more consumers
are willing to sample both rms in multiproduct search, which intensies the price
competition. On top of that, the joint search e¤ect gives rise to a complementary
pricing problem and induces rms to further lower their prices. This result is illustrated
in Figure 3 where the thin solid curves represent p0i and the thick solid curves represent
pi (they coincide only when s = 0). For example, in the uniform case with s = 0:1,
the multiproduct search price is 0:51, lower than the single-product search price 0:64
by 20%. I want to emphasize that even if economies of scale in search are weak (e.g.,
when multiproduct search is more costly than single-product search), the joint search
e¤ect can still induce substantial price reduction. For instance, in the uniform case, if
single-product search is half as costly as two-product search (i.e., if its search cost is
s=2), then the single-product search price becomes 1=(2 ps), depicted as the dashed
curve in Figure 3(a). The multiproduct search price is still signicantly lower than
that. For example, when s = 0:1, the new single-product search price is 0:59, and the
multiproduct search price is still lower than it by 13:5%.
If we extend the basic model by allowing for both single-product and multiproduct
searchers in the market, the above result implies that market prices will decline when
a higher proportion of consumers become multiproduct searchers, which is perhaps
the case during high-demand periods such as weekends and holidays. For example,
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many households conduct their weekly grocery shopping during weekends, and more
people buy multiple gifts in Christmas season.24 Thus, the multiproduct search model
can provide a possible explanation for the phenomenon of countercyclical pricing, i.e.,
prices of many retail products fall during demand peaks such as holidays and weekends.
(See relevant empirical evidence documented in Warner and Barsky (1995), MacDonald
(2000), Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi (2003) and others. All these paper use data from
multiproduct retailers such as supermarkets and department stores.)25
4 Bundling in Search Markets
Bundling is a widely used multiproduct pricing strategy. In practice, the most often
adopted form is that alongside each separately priced product, a package of more than
one product is sold at a discount relative to the components. For example, retailers
such as electronic stores, travel agencies and online book shops often o¤er a customer
a discount or reward (e.g., free delivery) if she buys more than one product from the
same store.26 This is termed mixed bundling. Another less often adopted form, termed
pure bundling, is that the rm only sells a package of all its products, and no product
is available for individual purchase.
Consumer search is clearly relevant in various circumstances where rms use bundling
strategies, and could have a signicant inuence on rmsincentive to bundle and the
welfare impacts of bundling. However, the existing literature on competitive bundling
assumes perfect information in the consumer side and has not explored this issue. This
section intends to ll this gap by allowing rms to adopt bundling strategies in the
multiproduct search model presented in section 3. I continue to focus on the duopoly
setting with two products. The rest of this section is organized as follows. I will rst
consider how bundling a¤ects consumerssearch incentive, which is the driving force
behind the main result in this section. I will then show that starting from the linear
pricing equilibrium, each rm does have an incentive to introduce bundling. After that,
24Another possible justication is that the demand uctuations may also arise endogenously: an-
ticipating rms pricing pattern, consumers may strategically accumulate their demand for various
products and shop intensively during low-price periods, which in turn justies rmspricing strategies.
25Warner and Barsky (1995) have much earlier suggested such a possible explanation based on
consumer search for countercyclical pricing, though they did not develop a formal search model. Their
idea is wholly based on economies of scale in search, while my model suggests that even if economies
of scale in search are weak, the joint search e¤ect can still induce multiproduct rms to reduce their
prices substantially. There are of course other existing explanations for countercyclical pricing. For
example, it may be due to the dynamic interaction among competing retailers who are more likely to
have a price war during demand booms (Rotemberg and Saloner, 1986). It may also be a consequence
of a rise of demand elasticity caused by more price advertising during high-demand periods (Lal and
Matutes, 1994).
26In a multiproduct environment, a two-part tari¤ a xed fee plus separate prices for each product
can also be regarded as a mixed bundling strategy. A typical example in the retail market is that the
shipping fee is often independent of the number of products (e.g., furniture items) in the same order.
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I will characterize bundling equilibrium and examine the welfare impacts of bundling
relative to linear pricing.
4.1 Bundling and consumer search incentive
I rst examine how bundling might a¤ect consumerssearch incentive. In the linear
pricing case, given match utilities (u1; u2) at rm 1, the expected benet from sampling
rm 2 is
E

max
 
0;
P2
i=1(vi   ui); v1   u1; v2   u2

: (17)
(This merely rewrites the left-hand side of (6). The expectation operator is over (v1; v2).)
If both products at rm 2 are a worse match, the consumer will return and buy at rm
1 and so the gain from the extra search will be zero; if both products at rm 2 are a
better match, the consumer will buy at rm 2 and gain
P2
i=1(vi   ui); if only product
i at rm 2 is the better match, she will mix and match and the gain will be vi   ui.
Suppose now both rms adopt the mixed bundling strategy and charge the same
prices. Let p^i denote the stand-alone price for product i and P^ denote the bundle price.
In the meaningful case, the bundle should be cheaper than buying the two products
separately (i.e., P^  p^1 + p^2). (Otherwise, no consumers will opt for the package and
we go back to the linear pricing case.) Let   p^1 + p^2   P^ denote the joint-purchase
discount. The bundle is also usually more expensive than each single product (i.e.,
P^ > p^i for i = 1; 2). (If the bundle is cheaper than either single product, rms are in
e¤ect using the pure bundling strategy.) Then, conditional on (u1; u2), the expected
benet of sampling rm 2 becomes
E

max
 
0;
P2
i=1(vi   ui); v1   u1   ; v2   u2   

: (18)
If the consumer buys both products from rm 2, the gain is the same as before (since
the bundle price is the same across rms); but if she sources supplies from both rms,
she must forgo the joint-purchase discount , which is the cost of mixing-and-matching.
(Note that for consumers this tari¤-intermediated cost plays the same role as an exoge-
nous cost involved in dealing with multiple rms.) This benet is clearly lower than
(17), i.e., mixed bundling reduces a consumers search incentive. (Pure bundling will
lead to an even lower search incentive.27) In other words, when both rms bundle,
consumers become more likely to stop at the rst sampled rm. As I will demonstrate
below, this may induce rms to compete less aggressively and reverse the usual welfare
impacts of competitive bundling in a perfect information setting.
27The exact search incentive with pure bundling depends on whether consumers can buy both bundles
and mix and match. If this is permitted, the expected benet of sampling rm 2 is E[max(0;
P2
i=1(vi 
ui); v1 u1 P; v2 u2 P )], since it now costs a bundle price P for a consumer to mix and match. If this
is not permitted (e.g., if pure bundling introduces the compatibility problem), the expected benet is
E[max(0;
P2
i=1(vi ui))], since the consumer has totally lost the opportunity of mixing-and-matching.
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4.2 Incentive to bundle
Before proceeding to the equilibrium analysis with bundling, I rst investigate, starting
from the linear pricing equilibrium, whether a rm has a unilateral incentive to bundle.
I suppose that rms choose their bundling strategies and prices simultaneously, and
both choices are unobservable to consumers until they reach the store. I will focus on
the incentive to employ mixed bundling. (A similar result as below can be established
for pure bundling if it is the only possible bundling strategy and if, once a rm bundles,
consumers cannot mix and match.) First of all, given the rivals linear prices, introduc-
ing mixed bundling cannot make a rm worse o¤ since it can at least set linear prices
(by setting  = 0). What I will show below is that each rm has a strict incentive to
choose  > 0.
Suppose rm 2 sticks to the linear equilibrium prices (p1; p2). Consider the following
deviation for rm 1: p^1 = p1 + ", p^2 = p2 + ", and P^ = p1 + p2, where " > 0. That is,
rm 1 raises each stand-alone price by ", but keeps the bundle price unchanged. I will
examine the impact of such a deviation on rm 1s prot as " approaches zero. First,
the consumers who originally bought a single product from rm 1 now pay more, which
of course brings rm 1 a benet.
There are also two demand e¤ects. First, for those consumers who sample rm 1
rst, due to the joint-purchase discount, more of them will stop searching and buy both
products immediately. More precisely, given (u1; u2), the expected benet of sampling
rm 2 now becomes E[max(0;
P2
i=1(vi  ui); v1  u1  "; v2  u2  ")], since mixing and
matching involves an extra outlay ". This is clearly lower than the search incentive
in the linear pricing case. (Note that in this model even increasing prices can reduce
consumerssearch incentive.28) Consumers who switch from keeping searching to buying
immediately will make a positive contribution to rm 1s prot.
Second, for those consumers who eventually sample both rms, the introduced joint-
purchase discount will make them buy from the same rm (but not necessarily rm 1)
with a higher probability. Firm 1 gains from those consumers who switch from two-stop
shopping to buying both products from it, but su¤ers from those who switch to buying
both products from rm 2. However, I show in the proof of the following proposition
that as "  0 the pros and cons just cancel out each other, such that this second demand
e¤ect has no rst-order e¤ect on rm 1s prot. Therefore, the proposed deviation is
strictly protable at least when " is small.
Proposition 6 Starting from the linear pricing equilibrium, each rm has a strict in-
centive to introduce mixed bundling.
In other words, if bundling is permitted and is costless for rms to implement,
then any symmetric equilibrium (if exists) must involve both rms using bundling
strategy. Note that our argument works even if the search cost is zero (then the second
28The increased stand-alone price is paid only when a consumer returns to rm 1 and buys a single
product, so it generates a returning cost for consumers who want to mix and match.
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e¤ect disappears). That is, each rm has a strict incentive to bundle even in a perfect
information scenario.29 Costly search provides rms with an extra incentive to do so.
4.3 The welfare impacts of bundling
I now investigate the welfare impact of bundling relative to linear pricing in a search
environment. The rst observation is that total welfare dened as the sum of industry
prot and consumer surplus must fall with bundling. With the assumption of full
market coverage, consumer payment is a pure transfer and only the match e¢ ciency
(including search costs) matters. Bundling reduces e¢ ciency because it not only results
in insu¢ cient consumer search (i.e., too few consumers search beyond the rst sampled
rm due to the joint-purchase discount) but also induces too many consumers who have
sampled both rms to buy both products from the same rm than is e¢ cient. This
result holds no matter whether information frictions exist or not.
In the following, I focus on the impacts of bundling on industry prot and consumer
surplus, which, however, depend on information frictions. To this end, I rst need
to characterize equilibrium prices when both rms bundle. However, the equilibrium
analysis with mixed bundling and costly search is fairly intricate. By contrast, pure
bundling is easier to analyze and can capture the key insight. Therefore, I will start
with analyzing the pure bundling case.
4.3.1 Pure bundling
As a pricing strategy, pure bundling is less often observed than mixed bundling. But it
may become relevant when implementing the mixed bundling strategy is rather costly
for rms (e.g., when the number of products is large). In the following analysis, I
assume that when both rms bundle, consumers buy only one of the two bundles, i.e.,
they will not buy both bundles to mix and match. This is the case, for instance, when
pure bundling introduces the compatibility problem, or when the equilibrium bundle
price is so high that it is not worthwhile to buy both bundles.30 (Nalebu¤, 2000, makes
the same assumption in studying competitive pure bundling.)
Equilibrium prices with pure bundling. When both rms bundle, consumers face a
single-product search problem: rm 1 o¤ers a composite product with a match utility
U = u1+u2 and rm 2 o¤ers another one with an independent match utility V = v1+v2.
Both U and V belong to [U = u1 + u2; U = u1 + u2]. Let G() and g() denote their
common cdf and pdf, respectively. Denote by b the reservation utility level in this search
29Armstrong and Vickers (2010) have shown a similar result in the Hotelling setting with perfect
information.
30For example, in the uniform example below, when the search cost is relatively high, the bundle
price is greater than 1. Then even for a consumer who values rm 1s products at (1; 0) and rm 2s
products at (0; 1), it is not worthwhile to buy both bundles.
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problem. It satises Z U
b
(U   b)dG(U) = s : (19)
The left-hand side is the expected benet from sampling the second bundle given the
rst one has a match utility b. Hence, in a symmetric equilibrium a consumer will
visit the second rm if and only if the rst bundle has a match utility below b. Since
pure bundling reduces consumers search incentive, the acceptance set expands, i.e.,
b < u1 + (u1) for u1 2 [a1; u1]. Figure 6 below illustrates this change in the consumer
stopping rule, where the linear line is the reservation frontier in the pure bundling case
and the new acceptance set is A plus the shaded area.
Let P be the equilibrium bundle price. Then, similar to (5), P is determined in
1
P
= g(b)[1 G(b)] + 2
Z b
U
g(U)2dU : (20)
P increases with the search costs provided that U has an increasing hazard rate, which
is true if each ui has an increasing hazard rate and is independent from uj (see, for
instance, Miravete, 2002).
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Figure 6: The optimal stopping rule linear pricing vs pure bundling
Comparison with linear pricing. When information is perfect, Matutes and Regibeau
(1988), Economides (1989), and Nalebu¤ (2000) have shown in the two-dimensional
Hotelling setting (with full market coverage) that pure bundling typically lowers price
(and prot) and boosts consumer welfare. This is mainly because pure bundling makes
a price reduction doubly protable, thereby intensifying price competition (the so-called
Cournot e¤ect).31
31This intuition is, however, incomplete because bundling also a¤ects the extent of product di¤er-
entiation (see also Economides, 1989). For example, in our random utility setting, the bundles match
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The same argument applies in our setting when the search cost is zero.32 Suppose
the two products are symmetric. Then from (12) and (20) we can see that at s = 0 (so
a = u and b = U) pure bundling results in a lower bundle price (P < 2p) if and only ifZ u
u
f(u)2du < 2
Z U
U
g(U)2dU : (21)
If the two productsvaluations are independent, one can check that this condition holds
for a variety of distributions such as uniform, normal and logistic. But it does not always
hold. For instance, as we will see below, in the exponential case the equality of (21)
holds.33
When search is costly, the pro-competitive e¤ect of pure bundling still applies among
the consumers who sample both rms. However, pure bundling weakens consumers
search incentive and so reduces the number of informed consumers in the rst place,
which has a tendency to soften price competition. The net e¤ect hinges on the relative
importance of these two forces. Intuitively, when the search cost is higher, there will
be fewer fully informed consumers and the rst e¤ect will appear less important. Then
pure bundling may lead to a higher bundle price. This intuition is conrmed in the
following examples.34
The uniform example: Suppose u1 and u2 are independent, and ui s U [0; 1]. To
facilitate the comparison with linear pricing, we keep the search cost condition
s  1=2. One can show that G(U) = U2=2 and g(U) = U if U 2 [0; 1], and
G(U) = 1   (2   U)2=2 and g(U) = 2   U if U 2 [1; 2]. According to (19),
the reservation utility b satises (2   b)3=6 = s (so b  1) if s 2 [0; 1=6], and
1  b+ b3=6 = s (so b < 1) if s 2 [1=6; 1=2]. Then (20) implies
P =
8>>>><>>>>:
1
4=3  s if s 2 [0; 1=6)
1
b3=6 + b
if s 2 [1=6; 1=2]
:
One can check that P increases with s, but the speed is much faster when s > 1=6.
(The upward sloping curve in Figure 7(a) below depicts how P   2p varies with
search costs.) This is because in the range of s 2 [0; 1=6), b > 1 and so as
s increases, the reservation frontier gets longer (i.e., there are more marginal
utility has a greater variance than a single product, which usually softens price competition. Therefore,
even with perfect information, whether pure bundling increases or decreases market price depends on
a delicate interplay of these two e¤ects. This accounts for why pure bundling does not always lead to
lower prices even in the perfect information setting (see, for example, the exponential example below).
32With perfect information our random utility model can be converted into a two-dimensional
Hotelling model.
33The opposite can also occur, for example, for a Weibull distribution f(u) = kuk 1e u
k
with k less
than but close to one.
34We can verify in both examples that (20) is also su¢ cient for the equilibrium price.
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consumers), which mitigates rmsincentive to raise prices. By contrast, after s
exceeds 1=6, b < 1 and so the reservation frontier gets shorteras s increases,
which strengthens rmsincentive to raise prices. In other words, when the reser-
vation frontier is still getting longer in the linear pricing case, it already starts
to get shorter in the bundling case. In particular, when the search cost exceeds
roughly 0:26, the bundle price is higher in the pure bundling case than in the
linear pricing case.
The exponential example: Suppose u1 and u2 are independent, and fi(ui) = e ui
for ui 2 [0;1). Then G(U) = 1   (1 + U)e U and g(U) = Ue U . (Note that U
has a strictly increasing hazard rate, though ui has a constant one.) According to
(19), the reservation utility b satises (2 + b)e b = s. Substituting G and g into
(20) yields
P =
2
1  e 2b ;
which increases with s and is always greater than the bundle price 2p in the linear
pricing case (except P = 2p at s = 0). (The upper curve in Figure 7(b) depicts
how P   2p varies with search costs in this example.) With pure bundling, as s
increases the reservation frontier always gets shorter in the exponential case,
which explains why pure bundling reverses the relationship between price and
search costs.
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(a): uniform example
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(b): exponential example
Figure 7: The impacts of pure bundling
Let us turn to welfare impacts. First, each rm earns a higher prot whenever pure
bundling leads to a higher bundle price (given the assumption of full market coverage).
Hence, given that total welfare always falls with bundling, consumers must become
worse o¤ if the bundle price rises in the pure bundling case. But things are less clear
when the bundle price falls because consumers also end up consuming less well matched
goods. In the uniform example, as indicated by the downward sloping curve in Figure
7(a) which represents the impact of pure bundling on consumer surplus relative to linear
pricing, pure bundling benets consumers when the search costs are lower than about
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0:24; while it harms consumers when the search costs exceed that threshold. In the
exponential case, pure bundling always harms consumers since it (weakly) raises the
bundle price for any search cost level. This is indicated by the lower curve in Figure
7(b).35 (Calculating consumer surplus directly in our multiproduct search framework
is complicated. I develop a more e¢ cient indirect method in the Appendix B.)
In sum, in a search environment pure bundling can generate a signicant competition-
relaxing e¤ect such that relative to linear pricing it can benet rms and harm con-
sumers, in contrast to the perfect information case.36
4.3.2 Mixed bundling
I aim to deliver a similar message as in the pure bundling case: since mixed bundling also
reduces consumerssearch incentive (and expands the stopping region), the reservation
frontier starts to become shorter with search costs earlier than in the linear pricing
case. As a result, when search costs are relatively high, prices with mixed bundling
may increase with search costs much faster than in the linear pricing case. This in turn
may lead to a positive impact of bundling on prots but a negative one on consumer
surplus.
The details of characterizing the symmetric equilibrium prices (p^1; p^2; ) are rele-
gated to the online supplementary document. Unlike the linear pricing or pure bundling
case, no analytical solution appears to be available even in the uniform or exponential
example. Here I report the main numerical observations from the uniform example:
(i) The joint-purchase discount  decreases with search costs but it does not vary too
much. When s increases from 0 to 0:5,  decreases from 0:333 to about 0:294. (ii) Both
the stand-alone prices and the bundle price increase with s. (iii) As depicted in Figure
8 below, relative to linear pricing, mixed bundling has a qualitatively similar impact
on industry prot (the upward sloping curve) and consumer surplus (the downward
sloping curve) as pure bundling. That is, when the search costs are relatively small,
mixed-bundling harms rms but benets consumers, while the opposite is true when
the search costs are relatively high. However, since mixed-bundling is less able to deter
consumers from searching than pure bundling, as we can see (by comparing Figures
7(a) and 8) higher search costs are needed to reverse the welfare impacts and the sizes
35A more extreme example is when the two products are symmetric and have perfectly negatively
correlated valuations. Then in the pure bundling case, the two bundles are in e¤ect homogenous.
With perfect information, we have the Bertrand competition and price will be equal to marginal cost,
which is often better than linear pricing for consumers; while with costly search, we have the Diamond
paradox in which all consumers stop at the rst sampled rm (if the rst search is costless) and the
price will be the monopoly price (in our setting the consumers willingness to pay), which is of course
worse than linear pricing for consumers.
36Nevertheless, the search-based anti-competitive e¤ect of bundling is most pronounced when the
number of goods a consumer is looking for is relatively small. For a given search cost, if a consumer
is looking for a large number of goods, she will almost surely sample both rms and the situation will
then be close to the perfect information case. In that case, as shown in a previous version of this paper,
under a regularity condition (f is logconcave), pure bundling benets consumers and harms rms.
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of impacts are also smaller.
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Figure 8: The impact of mixed bundling (uniform example)
5 Discussions
5.1 Asymmetric equilibria
The analysis so far has been conned to symmetric equilibria. Here I discuss the possi-
bility of two types of asymmetric equilibria in the duopoly model with linear pricing. In
one possible case, one rm sells both products cheaper than its rival, and expecting that
all consumers choose to visit it rst. This type of equilibria could be sustained because
consumersnon-random search order reveals information about their preferences they
visit the second rm only when they are unsatised with the rst rms products
and thereby the second rm indeed has an incentive to charge relatively high prices.
However, an analytical investigation of this kind of equilibria is rather involved (mainly
because the reservation frontier in equilibrium becomes now price dependent), and the
existence of this kind of equilibria also relies on coordinated consumer expectation.
In the other possible case, rms may put di¤erent products on sales but consumers
still search randomly. For example, in the case with two symmetric products, one rm
charges price pL for its product 1 and price pH > pL for its product 2, and the other
rm sets prices in the opposite way. However, as shown in the Appendix, this kind of
equilibria cannot be sustained under a regularity condition.
5.2 More rms
Considering an arbitrary number of rms entails a more intricate analysis (see the online
supplementary document for the details). But the main insights from the duopoly case
can survive.
Search cost and price. In the linear pricing case, when a rm lowers one products
price, more consumers who are currently visiting it for the rst time will stop searching,
which boosts the demand for its both products. So the joint search e¤ect is still present.
However, a subtle di¤erence emerges: for those consumers who stop searching at some
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rm (except at the rst one), they now do not necessarily buy both products from
that rm. Instead, some of them may go back to a previous rm to buy one product.
This tends to weaken the joint search e¤ect, but does not eliminate it. For instance,
in the exponential example with more rms prices can still decline with s (though not
necessarily everywhere on [0; 1]).37
Bundling. Bundling still reduces the anticipated benet from mixing-and-matching
after sampling more rms, and so restrains consumerssearch incentive. However, a new
opposite force will come into play when n  3 bundling now also restricts mixing-and-
matching among previous o¤ers and so lowers the maximum utility so far (except at
the rst rm), which can increase consumerssearch incentive.38 We can compare the
expected search times and the bundle price between linear pricing and pure bundling
in the uniform example. (Analyzing mixed bundling with more than two rms appears
rather intractable.) I nd that consumers search more intensively in the pure bundling
case only if n is su¢ ciently large and s is su¢ ciently small. In particular, even if
n = 1, we need s to be lower than about 0:03. This suggests that the new force may
be relatively weak most of the time. Consequently, pure bundling can still lead to a
higher bundle price (and lower consumer surplus). For example, when n = 1, this is
true at least when s is greater than about 0:38.
The number of rms and price. The general model with n rms also allows us
to examine how the number of rms a¤ects market prices in a multiproduct search
environment. In the single-product case, Anderson and Renault (1999) have shown
that the equilibrium price decreases with n under the regularity condition. But this
is no longer true in our multiproduct case. Although an analytical investigation is
infeasible, numerical simulations suggest that prices can increase with n. For instance,
in the uniform example with s = 0:5, the duopoly price is 0:583 while the price for
n = 1 is 0:602. (More examples are provided in the supplementary document.) The
intuition is that when there are more rms, it becomes more likely that a consumer,
when she stops searching, will return to previously visited rms to buy some products.
This weakens the joint search e¤ect and so the complementary pricing problem such
that rms may raise their prices.
5.3 Costly recall
When recall is costly, the optimal stopping rule has a new feature: when one product
is a good match and the other is a bad match, a consumer may buy the well matched
product rst (to avoid paying the returning cost) and then continue to search for the
other. As a result, each rm will (endogenously) face both single-product searchers
(who have bought one product from some previous rm) and multiproduct searchers.
37When n =1, if prices tend to zero at s  0, then they cannot decrease with s at least when s is
small. However, the perfect-information prices for n = 1 may not be equal to zero, for example, in
the exponential case.
38For example, when the rst rm o¤ers (0; 1) and the second rm o¤ers (1; 0), linear pricing obvi-
ously leads to higher maximum utilities so far than pure bundling.
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The joint search e¤ect survives, but the e¤ect of bundling on consumer search can be
di¤erent. For instance, in the polar case with no recall, since consumers cannot return
to mix and match anyway, bundling does not reduce consumerssearch incentive any
more. However, in a more reasonable case where recall is costly but not totally banned,
the search-discouraging e¤ect of bundling, though reduced, will persist.
A complete analysis with costly recall is beyond the scope of this paper. In e¤ect,
when the returning cost is mild (such that returning consumers exist), the optimal
stopping rule does not have a simple characterization even in the duopoly case.
5.4 Search costs vs shopping costs
Search costs usually mean the costs incurred to nd and evaluate a new option. The
literature sometimes also considers shopping costs. Literally, shopping costs should
include all costs except payment involved in a shopping process, so search costs (if
they exist) should be part of it. In a single-product case, these two terms are often
used exchangeablely, because if there are any shopping costs they are usually related
with search activity. However, in a multiproduct case, even if information is perfect
(e.g., when rms advertise both product and price information), there may still exist
substantial shopping costs (e.g., the costs of conducting extra transactions) when the
customer sources supplies from more than one rm (see, for instance, Klemperer, 1992,
and Armstrong and Vickers, 2010). This type of shopping costs can cause a similar
e¤ect as our joint search e¤ect, i.e., it renders two independent products in each rm
complements and so has a tendency to intensify price competition. Nevertheless, there is
an essential di¤erence between search costs and this kind of shopping costs. Search costs
always have their own anti-competition e¤ect since they reduce consumers incentive
to shop around, while shopping costs in a perfect information setting are usually pro-
competitive. In e¤ect, shopping costs are similar to the joint-purchase discount in
the mixed bundling scenario. If information is initially perfect, shopping costs tend
to intensify competition and reduce market prices. While if information is initially
imperfect and consumers need to conduct costly search, as we have learned from the
bundling exercise shopping costs (which is similar to the joint-purchase discount) can
work in the opposite way by reducing consumers search incentive. Therefore, how
(search unrelated) shopping costs a¤ect competition may crucially depend on whether
search costs are present or not in the same time.
5.5 Intrinsic complementary products
In reality the products a consumer is looking for in a particular shopping trip are rarely
entirely independent as I assumed in the model. In many circumstances (e.g., when
shop for clothes and shoes), they are more or less intrinsic complements in the sense
that a higher valuation for one product increases the consumers willingness to pay for
the other (e.g., the utility function takes the form of u1 + u2 + u1u2 with  > 0). I
assumed independent products mainly for tractability. (However, with the assumption
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of full market coverage, we can actually regard the two products in the model as perfect
complements, i.e., only consuming the two products together can generate utility.)
If we consider intrinsic complements in the multiproduct search framework, then the
reservation frontier may no longer be decreasing in the utility space.39 This is because
now nding a better matched product 1 may strictly increase a consumers incentive
to nd a better matched product 2. This will greatly complicate calculation (e.g.,
when the utility function takes the form of u1 + u2 + u1u2, I am unable to nd an
analytically tractable example). When there are more than two rms, considering
intrinsic complements will render the optimal stopping rule non-stationary (see Gatti,
1999 for a related discussion), which will further complicate the analysis. However, the
joint search e¤ect and the e¤ect of bundling on consumer search incentive should be
still present, and so our main results may hold qualitatively.
Another point deserves mentioning is that intrinsic complementarity is di¤erent from
the complementarity caused by the joint search e¤ect. The latter means that reducing
the price of a rms one product will stop more consumers from searching on and so
increase the demand for the same rms other product as well. However, if information
is perfect and the two products are intrinsic complements, then making a rms one
product cheaper will not inuence the consumer decision of where to buy the other
product. Hence, considering a perfect information setting with intrinsic complements
cannot reproduce the main results in this paper.
6 Conclusion
This paper has explored a multiproduct search model and shown how consumers and
rms may behave di¤erently compared to a single-product search framework. In par-
ticular, the presence of the joint search e¤ect may induce prices to decline with search
costs and to rise with the number of rms. The developed framework has also been
used to address other economic issues such as countercyclical pricing and bundling, and
new insights emerged. For instance, I nd that compared to the perfect information
scenario, the welfare assessment of competitive bundling can be reversed in a search
environment.
Our multiproduct search framework has other possible applications including the
following.
Multiproduct vs single-product shops. In the market, large multiproduct sellers often
coexist with smaller competitors (e.g., specialist shops). We can modify the basic model
to investigate this kind of market structure. Consider a market with three asymmetric
39For example, when the utility function takes the form of u1 + u2 + u1u2, one can check that in
the duopoly case the reservation frontier satises
1
2
(1  u1)2 + 1
2
(1  u2)2 + 
4

(u1   u2)2 + (1  u1u2)2

= s ;
and it is not a monotonically decreasing curve in the (u1; u2) space if  > 0.
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rms: rm 1 supplies two products (say, clothes and shoes), while rms 2 and 3 are
two single-product shops (say, rm 2 is a clothes shop and rm 3 is a shoe shop).
Suppose the costs of reaching any rm are identical for all rms, and consumers visit
rm 1 rst (which can be rational in equilibrium). After visiting the multiproduct
rm 1, a consumer will continue to visit rm 2 (rm 3) if and only if rm 1 o¤ers
unsatisfactory clothes (shoes). In this simple setting, changing the clothes price will no
longer a¤ect a consumers decision whether to visit the shoe shop, so the joint search
e¤ect disappears and rms have two separate competitions for each product. However,
other interesting insights will emerge. Given all consumers visit rm 1 rst, their search
order reveals information about their preferences: a consumer will visit a single-product
shop only if she is unsatised with the product in the multiproduct shop. This gives
the single-product shop extra monopoly power and induces it to charge a higher price.40
Therefore, this variant can explain why multiproduct shops often set lower prices than
their smaller competitors, without appealing to other exogenous reasons such as the
multiproduct shops economies of scale in operations or its advantage in bargaining
with manufacturers.
Advertising and loss leaders. In the case of asymmetric products, we have found
that rms have an incentive to sacrice the prot from some small item to induce
more consumers to buy the more protable big item. This opens up the possibility of
using the loss-leading strategy, but I have not found an example with some product
being priced below its cost. Allowing for price advertising, however, may generate
real loss leaders (see Lal and Matutes, 1994, for instance). Reducing a products price
(privately) can only stop some consumers who are already in the store from searching
on, but advertising this price cut can increase the store tra¢ c in the rst place. This
suggests that rms may compete intensely via advertised prices to attract consumers,
and compensate the possibly resulted loss by charging high prices for unadvertised
products (which can be sustained because of costly search). Compared to Lal and
Matutes (1994), our richer setting may better predict which products will be sold as
loss leaders. This remains another interesting future research topic.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 3: I only prove the result for ~p2 (the proof for ~p1 is similar). The
price ~p2, when both rms ignore the joint search e¤ect, is given by
1
~p2
= 2
Z
B
f2(u2)dF (u) +
Z u1
a1
[1  F2((u1))]f(u1; (u1))du1 (22)
=
Z u1
u1
(
2
Z (u1)
u2
f2(u2)h2(u2ju1)du2 + [1  F2((u1))]h2((u1)ju1)
)
dF1(u1) :
40See a similar logic in Armstrong, Vickers, and Zhou (2009) where a prominent rm which is
always sampled rst by consumers in a single-product search scenario charges a lower price than its
non-prominent rivals.
34
(Note that for u1 < a1, (u1) is independent of s and 1 F2((u1)) = 0.) The regularity
condition (13) implies f2(x)h2(xju1) + [1  F2(x)]h02(xju1)  0. Then the bracket term
in (22) is an increasing function of (u1). Moreover, (u1) is the only element related
with s and it decreases with s.41 Therefore, (22) decreases with s, i.e., ~p2 increases with
s.
Proof of Proposition 2: In the case of symmetric products, from (12) we know the
standard e¤ect is
 = 2
Z
B
f(ui)dF (u) +
Z u
a
[1  F ((u))]f(u; (u))du
=
Z u
u
(
2
Z (u)
u
f(ui)h(uiju)dui + [1  F ((u))]h((u)ju)
)
dF (u) :
(Note that for u < a, (u) is independent of a and 1 F ((u)) = 0.) Using the notation
(xju)  f(x)h(xju) + [1  F (x)]h0(xju) ; (23)
we have
d
ds
=
Z u
a
d(u)
ds
((u)ju)dF (u)
=
Z u
a
0(u)
1  F (u)((u)ju)dF (u)
=  
Z u
a
f((x))
1  F ((x))(xj(x))dx :
The second step used
d(u)
ds
=   1
1  F ((u)) ; 
0(u) =   1  F (u)
1  F ((u)) ; (24)
which are both derived from the denition of () in (6). The last step is from changing
the integral variable from u to x = (u) and using the symmetry of ().
The joint search e¤ect is  =
R u
a
[1  F (u)]f(u; (u))du, and so
d
ds
= f(a; u) 
Z u
a
d(u)
ds
[1  F (u)]h0((u)ju)f(u)du
= f(a; u) 
Z u
a
[ 0(u)]h0((u)ju)f(u)du
= f(a; u) 
Z u
a
h0(xj(x))f((x))dx :
41From the denition of () in (6), we have d(u1)ds =   11 F2((u1)) < 0 for u1 > a1, i.e., the
reservation frontier moves downward as the search cost rises; and (u1) > u2 for u1 < a1 and is
independent of s.
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The rst step used da
ds
=  1=[1  F (a)], the second step used (24), and the last step is
again from changing the integral variable from u to x = (u). Therefore, p = 1=(+)
increases with s if and only if d
ds
+ d
ds
 0 or the condition (15) in the main text holds.
Now suppose the two products have independent valuations and the marginal density
satises f 0(u)  0. Then
 d
ds
=
Z u
a
f((x))
1  F ((x))ff(x)
2 + [1  F (x)]f 0(x)gdx

Z u
a
f((x))
1  F ((x))f(x)
2dx
 f(a)
1  F (a)
Z u
a
f(x)2dx
 f(a)
2
1  F (a)
Z u
a
f(x)dx = f(a)2 ;
and
 d
ds
=
Z u
a
f 0(x)f((x))dx  f(a)f(u)
 f(a)[f(u)  f(a)]  f(a)f(u) =  f(a)2 :
Therefore, d
ds
+ d
ds
 0, i.e., p increases with s.
Proof of Proposition 3: I rst derive the rst-order conditions for the linear pricing
case with m products. Let u i  (uj)j 6=i 2 Rm 1. In a symmetric equilibrium, without
loss of generality the reservation frontier can be dened as um = (u m), where (u m)
satises
m 1X
i=1
 i(ui) + m((u m)) = s :
As in the two-product case, let A denote the acceptance set and B denote its comple-
ment. Suppose rm 2 sticks to the equilibrium prices, and rm 1 lowers pm by a small
". Following the same logic as in the two-product case, we have the rst-order condition
for pm:
1 = 2pm
Z
B
fm(um)dF (u) + pm
Z
A m
[1  Fm((u m))]f(u m; (u m))du m| {z }
standard e¤ect
+
m 1X
i=1
pi
Z
A m
[1  Fi(ui)]f(u m; (u m))du m| {z }
joint search e¤ect
: (25)
This can be understood as follows. First of all, the price reduction leads to a loss "=2
since the half consumers who buy product m from rm 1 now pay less. The gain from
this price reduction consists of three parts. (i) The consumers who sample both rms
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will buy product m from rm 1 more likely, and this benet is "=2 times the rst term
in (25). (ii) Some consumers who sample rm 1 rst will switch from searching on to
buying at rm 1 immediately. More precisely, the reservation frontier moves downward
by " along the dimension of um. Denote by A m the projection of A on an (m   1)-
dimensional hyperplane with a xed um. Then the measure of these marginal consumers
is
"
2
Z
A m
f(u m; (u m))du m :
For a marginal consumer with (u m; (u m)), she would come back to buy product m
with a probability Fm((u m)) even if she searched on. So the net benet from the
increased demand for product m is "=2 times the second term in (25). (iii) Similarly,
the net benet from the increased demand for all other products is "=2 times the third
term in (25), which is the joint search e¤ect.
Now consider the uniform case with m symmetric products and independent valu-
ations. Then the rst integral in (25) measures the volume of solid B, and so it equals
one minus the volume of solid A. Since A is 1=2m of an m-dimensional sphere with a
radius
p
2s, we get
1  Vm(
p
2s)
2m
:
(See the expression for Vm() in footnote 23.) The second integral equalsZ
A m
[1  (u m)]du m = Vm(
p
2s)
2m
;
since it just measures the volume of A. Finally, the third integral equalsZ
A m
(1  u1)du m = Vm(
p
2s)
2m 1
: (26)
(This equality has no straightforward geometric interpretation. See its proof below.)
Then (16) in the main text follows.
Proof of (26): For m = 2, A m = [a; 1] and (26) is easy to be veried. Now consider
m  3. Let A 1;m(u1) be a sliceof A m at u1. Then we haveZ
A m
(1  u1)du m =
Z 1
a
(1  u1)
 Z
A 1;m(u1)
du 1;m
!
du1 :
SinceA 1;m(u1) is 1=2m 2 of an (m 2)-dimensional sphere with a radius r =
p
2s  (1  u1)2,
the internal integral term equals
Vm 2(r)
2m 2
=
(m 2)=2  rm 2
2m 2 (m=2)
;
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where  () is the Gamma function. Hence,Z
A m
(1  u1)du m = 
(m 2)=2
2m 2 (m=2)

Z 1
a
(1  u1)
p
2s  (1  u1)2
m 2
du1
=
(m 2)=2
2m 2 (m=2)

 p
2s
m
m
=
Vm(
p
2s)
2m 1
:
The second step used a = 1 p2s and the fact that the integrand is the derivative of
1
m
(
p
2s  (1  u1)2)m with respect to u1. The last step used the expression for Vm()
and the fact x (x) =  (x+ 1).
Proof of Proposition 4: In the case with two symmetric products, if the search costs
satisfy  i(u) < s < 2 i(u), the equilibrium price p is given by
1
p
= 2
Z
B
f(ui)dF (u) +
Z c
u
[1  F ((u))]f(u; (u))du| {z }
standard e¤ect: 
+
Z c
u
[1  F (u)]f(u; (u))du| {z }
joint search e¤ect: 
;
where c = (u). This is the same as (12), except the domain of () is now di¤erent
(see Figure 5). Following the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 2, one can verify
that
d
ds
=   f(c; u)
1  F (c)  
Z c
u
f((u))
1  F ((u))(uj(u))du
and
d
ds
=  f(c; u) 
Z c
u
h0(uj(u))f((u))du ;
where () is dened in (23).
I aim to show d
ds
+ d
ds
 0 under the proposed conditions. Independent valuations
and increasing hazard rate imply (uj(u))  0. So it su¢ ces to show
f(c)f(u)
2  F (c)
1  F (c) +
Z c
u
f 0(u)f((u))du  0 : (27)
If f 0  0, (27) is obviously true. Now suppose f 0 < 0. Since f 0    f2
1 F (which is
implied by the increasing hazard rate condition), the second term in (27) is greater
than
 
Z c
u
f(u)2
1  F (u)f((u))du   
f(c)
1  F (c)
Z c
u
f(u)f((u))du
  f(c)f(u)
1  F (c)
Z c
u
f(u)du
=  f(c)f(u)
1  F (c) F (c) :
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The rst inequality used increasing hazard rate, and the second one used f 0 < 0. Hence,
we only need [2  F (c)]  F (c)  0, which is always true.
Proof of Proposition 5: Recall ~pi is product is price if both rms ignore the joint
search e¤ect, and pi  ~pi. So it su¢ ces to show ~pi  p0i . Let us consider product 2 (the
proof for product 1 is similar). The price ~p2 is dened in (22). We have known that
under the regularity condition (13), the bracket term in (22) is an increasing function
of (u1). Since (u1)  a2, it is greater than
2
Z a2
u2
f2(u2)h2(u2ju1)du2 + [1  F2(a2)]h2(a2ju1) :
Realizing
R u1
u1
h2(xju1)dF1(u1) = f2(x), we obtain
1
~p2

Z u1
u1
(
2
Z a2
u2
f2(u2)h2(u2ju1)du2 + [1  F2(a2)]h2(a2ju1)
)
dF1(u1)
= 2
Z a2
u2
f2(u2)
2du2 + [1  F2(a2)]f2(a2) = 1
p02
:
Proof of Proposition 6: Following the argument in the main text, I only need to
show that the second demand e¤ect has no rst-order impact on rm 1s prot. Given
that rm 2 sticks to the linear prices (p1; p2) and rm 1 deviates to p^i = pi + " and
P^ = p1 + p2, a consumers demand pattern after sampling both rms (conditional on
the match utilities at the rst sampled rm) is depicted in Figure 10 below, where
the dashed lines indicate the boundaries in the linear pricing equilibrium and the solid
lines indicate the boundaries after rm 1 deviates. It is clear that more consumers now
buy both products from the same rm. For a consumer who samples rm 1 rst and
then visits rm 2 (so she must have u 2 B(") which converges to B as " ! 0), the
shaded areas in Figure A1(a) represent the probability (conditional on (u1; u2)) that
she switches from two-stop shopping to buying from the same rm. The pros and cons
of such a change for rm 1 are also indicated in the gure. For example, rm 1 gains p2
from a consumer who originally only bought product 1 from rm 1 but now buys both
products from it, indicated by +p2in the left shaded strip. A similar change occurs
to a consumer who samples rm 2 rst and then visits rm 1 (so she must have v 2 B).
This is depicted in Figure A1(b). Due to the symmetry of rms (i.e., for every u 2 B in
Figure A1(a), there is a corresponding v 2 B in Figure A1(b)) and the random search
order, one can see that all e¤ects in these two gures just cancel out each other.
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(a): Sample rm 1 rst (u1; u2) (b): Sample rm 2 rst (v1; v2)
Figure A1: Demand pattern after sampling both rms
About asymmetric equilibria in the duopoly model: This part aims to show
that in the duopoly setting with two symmetric products and independent valuations,
under the regularity condition that the marginal densify f is logconcave, there do not
exist asymmetric equilibria in which one rm, say, rm 1, charges (pL; pH) and rm 2
charges (pH ; pL) with pL < pH and consumers search in a random order. To this end,
I will argue that starting from a hypothetical asymmetric equilibrium as above, it is a
protable deviation for rm 1 to set prices (pL + "; pH   ") with a small " > 0, given
that rm 2 sticks to the equilibrium strategy and consumers hold the equilibrium belief.
For notational convenience, let   pH   pL > 0.
Consider the above hypothetical asymmetric equilibrium. Denote by (u1) the
reservation frontier for those consumers who sample rm 1 rst. It satises
(u1 +) + ((u1) ) = s:
(Charging a price lower/higher than its rival by  is equivalent to supplying a product
with match utility higher/lower than its rival by .) Then
(u1) = (u1 +) +: (28)
Relative to the reservation frontier () in the symmetric equilibrium with  = 0,
the new reservation frontier () has shifted leftward by  and then upward by .
Similarly, for those consumers who sample rm 2 rst, their stopping rule can be char-
acterized by (v2) which solves ((v2) )+ (v2 +) = s. The following graphs
illustrate the reservation frontiers (the thick lines) in the hypothetical equilibrium, rel-
ative to those (the feint lines) in the symmetric equilibrium.
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u1
u2
A
B
(u1)
a1()
a2()
(a): sampling rm 1 rst
v1
v2
A^
B^
(v2)
a2()
a1()
(b): sampling rm 2 rst
Figure A2: Asymmetric pricing and the stopping rule
It is ready to see a1() = (u )  (if u =1, a1() = a ) and a2() = a+.
Notice that () is no longer symmetric around the 45-degree line, and if u <1, it also
has a at segment on the interval [u   ; u] (which has not been precisely indicated
in the above graphs). In the following, for notational simplicity, I will restrict the
discussion to the case with u =1.
Now I start to derive the rst-order e¤ects of the small deviation (pL+ "; pH   ") on
rm 1s prots. Denote by Qi the number of consumers who buy product i from rm
1 in the hypothetical equilibrium.
(i) The rst-order e¤ects of lowering rm 1s pH by " (but keeping pL unchanged). I
follow the same logic as that used in the main text of the paper to derive the rst-order
conditions for the symmetric equilibrium. The direct loss from this deviation is "Q2.
But it also leads to two gains. First, those consumers who sample rm 1 rst will stop
searching more likely (the reservation frontier shifts downward by "), which generates
a gain
"
2
pH
Z 1
a 
[1 F ((u1) )]f(u1; (u1))du1+
"
2
pL
Z 1
a 
[1 F (u1+)]f(u1; (u1))du1:
Recalling (u1) = (u1 + ) +  from (28) and changing the integral variable from
u1 to u = u1 +, we can rewrite the above expression as
"
2
pH
Z 1
a
[1  F ()]f(u ; +)du+ "
2
pL
Z 1
a
[1  F (u)]f(u ; +)du: (29)
(The dependent variable in (u) has been suppressed.) Second, for those consumers
who sample both rms, they will buy product 2 from rm 1 more likely, which generates
a gain
"
2
pH
Z
B
f(u2  )dF (u) +
Z
B^
f(v2 +)dF (v)

: (30)
(Here B(B^) is the non-stopping region for those consumers who sample rm 1(2) rst
as illustrated in Figure A2.)
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(ii) The rst-order e¤ects of raising rm 1s pL by " (but keeping pH unchanged).
The direct gain from this deviation is "Q1. But it also causes two losses. First, those
consumers who visit rm 1 rst will continue to search more likely (the reservation
frontier shifts rightward by "), which leads to a loss
"
2
pH
Z 1
a+
[1 F (u2 )]f( 1 (u2); u2)du2+
"
2
pL
Z 1
a+
[1 F ( 1 (u2)+)]f( 1 (u2); u2)du2:
By changing the integral variable from u2 to u = 
 1
 (u2)+ (and so u2 = (u ) =
(u) + ), we can rewrite it as
"
2
pH
Z 1
a
[1 F ()]f(u ; +)( 0)du+ "
2
pL
Z 1
a
[1 F (u)]f(u ; +)( 0)du:
(31)
Second, for those consumers who sample both rms, they will buy product 1 from rm
1 less likely, which leads to a loss
"
2
pL
Z
B
f(u1 +)dF (u) +
Z
B^
f(v1  )dF (v)

(32)
I claim the following result, which completes the argument.
Claim 1 Suppose the two products have independent valuations, i.e., f(u1; u2) = f(u1)f(u2),
and the marginal density f is logconcave. Then the sum of all gains from the deviation,
i.e., "Q1+(29)+(30), is greater than the sum of all losses, i.e., "Q2+(31)+(32).
Proof. First, Q1 > Q2 since product 1 is cheaper but product 2 is more expensive
at rm 1 than at rm 2. So the gain "Q1 from raising pL by " is greater than the loss
"Q2 from lowering pH by ". Second, the symmetry of the setting impliesZ
B
f(u2  )dF (u) =
Z
B^
f(v1  )dF (v);
Z
B
f(u1 +)dF (u) =
Z
B^
f(v2 +)dF (v):
Thus, the gain in (30) is greater than the loss in (32).
Finally, I show that the gain in (29) is also greater than the loss in (31) if the two
products have independent valuations and the marginal density f is logconcave. Notice
that Z 1
a
[1  F ()]f(u ; +)( 0)du =
Z 1
a
[1  F (u)]f(u ; +)du:
(Recall  0 = 1 F (u)
1 F () .) Then it su¢ ces to show that
pH
Z 1
a
[F (u)  F ()]f(u ; +)du
 pL
Z 1
a
[1  F (u)]f(u ; +)( 0   1)du
= pL
Z 1
a
[F ()  F (u)]f(u ; +)( 0)du
= pL
Z 1
a
[F (u)  F ()]f( ; u+)du: (33)
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(The last step is from changing the integral variable.)
I rst argue that
R1
a
[F (u)  F ()]f(u )f(+)du > 0 if f is logconcave. Let
u^ solve u = (u). Then the left-hand side equalsZ u^
a
[F (u)  F ()]f(u )f(+)du+
Z 1
u^
[F (u)  F ()]f(u )f(+)du
=
Z 1
u^
[F ()  F (u)]f( )f(u+)( 0)du+
Z 1
u^
[F (u)  F ()]f(u )f(+)du
>
Z 1
u^
[F ()  F (u)]f( )f(u+)du+
Z 1
u^
[F (u)  F ()]f(u )f(+)du
=
Z 1
u^
[F (u)  F ()][f(u )f(+)  f( )f(u+)]du: (34)
(The rst equality is from changing the integral variable. The inequality is because
 < u and  0 2 (0; 1) for u 2 (u^;1).) If f is logconcave, then we have
ln f(+)  ln f( )  ln f(u+)  ln f(u )
given  < u and  > 0, which implies that (34) is positive.
Then to have (33), it remains to proveZ 1
a
[F (u)  F ()][f(u )f(+)  f( )f(u+)]du  0:
This can be done by dividing the integral interval into [a; u^] and [u^;1] and then applying
the same logic as in showing (34) to be positive.
Appendix B: Calculating Consumer Surplus
In our search model (especially in the case of linear pricing or mixed bundling), it
is complicated to calculate consumer surplus directly. Here I develop a more e¢ cient
indirect method (which also carries over to the case with more than two rms).
For any given symmetric price vector p (which can a linear pricing, pure bundling,
or mixed bundling scheme) and search cost s, consumer surplus is
v(sjp) = sup
2
[U(jp)  s  t()] ; (35)
where  is the (well-dened) set of all possible stopping rules, U(jp) is the expected
match utility minus payment if the consumer chooses a particular stopping rule , and
t() is the expected search times. Let (sjp) be the optimal stopping rule associated
with p and s. Since the objective function in (35) is linear in s, v(sjp) is convex in s
and so is di¤erentiable almost everywhere. Then the envelope theorem implies that
v0(sjp) =  t((sjp))   t^(sjp) :
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If p is an equilibrium price vector, then t^(sjp) is just the corresponding equilibrium
number of searches. (In the duopoly case, it equals two minus the measure of the
stopping region.) We can then decompose consumer surplus into two parts:
v(sjp) = v(0jp) 
Z s
0
t^(xjp)dx ; (36)
where the rst term captures the surplus when the information is perfect (but given
prices p), and the second term reects the ine¢ ciency caused by imperfect information
and costly search.
We can apply the general formula (36) to any case discussed in this paper. For
example, in the linear pricing case with two rms, v(0jp) =P2i=1 (E[max (ui; vi)]  pi),
and the optimal stopping rule is independent of p and so t^(x) = 2  A(x), where A(x)
is the measure of the acceptance set when the search cost is x. In the pure bundling
case, v(0jp) = E[max (U; V )] P and t^(x) = 1+G(b(x)). However, the implementation
in the mixed bundling case is slightly more complicated. First, the joint-purchase
discount  a¤ects the optimal stopping rule and so the equilibrium number of searches.
Second, how to calculate v(0jp) is now not so straightforward. Realize that in the mixed
bundling case with p = (p^1; p^2; ), we have
v(0jp) = E [max (u1 + u2 + ; v1 + v2 + ; u1 + v2; v1 + u2)]| {z }
w()
  (p^1 + p^2) :
The expectation is taken over all random variables ui and vi. Although w(0) =P2
i=1 E [max (ui; vi)] is straightforward to calculate, w() for  > 0 is not. In the
following, I explain how to derive a formula for w(). Realize that
w0() = 2 Q12() = 1  2 Q1() ;
where 2 Q12() is the probability that a consumer buys both products from the same
rm in the perfect information case (i.e., the probability that either of the rst two
terms in w() dominates), and 2 Q1() is the probability of a consumer mixing and
matching (i.e., the probability that the third or fourth term in w() dominates). The
rst equality is because when the joint-purchase discount  is increased by a small ", a
consumer will benet " when she buys both products from the same rm, which occurs
with a probability 2 Q12(). (Of course, the change of  also a¤ects which term in w()
dominates, but that e¤ect on w() is of second order when " is small.) Thus, we obtain
w() = w(0) +
Z 
0
[1  2 Q1(z)]dz :
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